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The Government in the United Kingdom rests for its continuation in office on the confidence of the 
House of Commons.  Until 2011, it was a convention of the constitution that a Government defeated on 
a motion of confidence resigned or requested the dissolution of Parliament.  There were different 
categories of confidence votes.  The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 puts on a statutory basis the 
conditions for a general election following the loss of an explicitly worded motion of no confidence.  
Though not intended to do so initially, the provisions of the Act limit the options available to the Prime 
Minister in the event of a vote of no confidence and in so doing removed a significant power to 
maximise parliamentary strength in key votes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In parliamentary systems of government, the executive normally rests on the confidence of the 
legislature for its continuance in office.  If the legislature passes a vote of censure, the government 
goes, either by resigning or calling fresh elections.  The United Kingdom is not unusual in this 
respect.  However, in 2011 the capacity to force an election through voting no confidence in the 
Government almost was lost.  In the event, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 modified the 
consequences of the House of Commons expressing its lack of confidence in the Government.  Here, 
we analyse how this outcome was arrived at.  It was the result of the distinctive basis of the 
convention governing votes of confidence in the UK, the formation of a coalition Government and a 
2 
 
failure on the part of those negotiating the coalition agreement to appreciate the nature of the 
convention.    
 
We begin by establishing the significance in parliamentary systems of executives resting on the 
confidence of the legislature, the particular nature of the relationship in the UK and how it was 
challenged and then modified in the transition from coalition agreement to legislation.  Under the 
coalition agreement negotiated in May 2010, the ability to force an election through passing a vote of 
confidence would have disappeared.  Under the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill as introduced into the 
House of Commons, it would have continued in its existing form.  Under the measure as enacted – the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act – it is retained in limited form.  The Act has notable consequences for 
Government, not least in removing the option available to the Prime Minister to maximise voting 
loyalty on the part of Government backbenchers; that is, by designating a vote as one of confidence, 
defeat on which would precipitate a general election.  It was an option rarely employed, but its 
availability was a powerful weapon – the parliamentary nuclear option – in the Prime Minister’s 
arsenal.  Other weapons remain, but nothing to match the immediacy and impact of triggering a 
general election. 
 
2. The significance of parliamentary confidence  
 
One of the defining characteristics of parliamentary systems of government is that the executive rests 
upon the confidence of the legislature for its continuance in office. ‘In parliamentary systems’, as 
Douglas Verney recorded, ‘the government is responsible to the assembly which may, if it thinks that 
the government is acting unwisely or unconstitutionally, refuse to give it support’ (Verney 1992, p. 
36).  It may refuse its support through, as he notes, a vote of censure or by not assenting to an 
important Government proposal.  By so doing, it may force the Government out of office.  
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How confidence is expressed is therefore central to any parliamentary system.  Practice varies, though 
it is common for confidence to be tested through a vote of the sole or principal chamber.  Of the 158 
nations listed by Fish and Kroenig (2009) in their Handbook of National Legislatures, no fewer than 
97 have some provision for a vote of confidence.  In all bar two cases, the vote of confidence takes 
place in one chamber.  In Romania, a motion of no confidence has to be carried by both chambers in 
joint session.  Kazakhstan also has provision for a vote by a joint session. 
 
As a parliamentary system, the UK is not unusual.  The Government rests on the confidence of the 
elected House, the House of Commons, and that confidence is expressed through a vote of the House.  
However, the House of Commons is distinctive in that, until 2011, the provision for confidence votes 
was not embodied in a codified constitution or in statute.  The situation was governed by convention. 
 
Conventions are rules of behaviour designed to adapt the legal position to the political reality (see 
Marshall 1984). There was no legal requirement for a Government to resign or seek the dissolution of 
Parliament if it lost a vote of censure.  However, it did so.  There was a political sanction: it would be 
virtually impossible to continue governing, since it was unlikely it would be able to get the House to 
vote for supply.  However, as David Feldman has argued, conventions are complied with because of a 
moral imperative: ‘They are obeyed because they encapsulate right behaviour’ (Feldman 213, p. 95).  
A practice develops, and becomes a convention, because it is accepted as the appropriate means of 
proceeding in the light of changed circumstances.  The precedent was set in 1841 and followed 
thereafter that, if the House expressed its lack of confidence in the Government, the Prime Minister 
tendered the Government’s resignation or asked the monarch to call a general election.    
 
If the Prime Minister requested a dissolution following the loss of a censure vote, there was no legal 
requirement for the sovereign to accede to the request.  In 1924, King George V did check that neither 
of the Conservative and Liberal leaders was prepared to form a Government after Prime Minister 
Ramsay MacDonald decided to make votes on an opposition motion and Liberal amendment matters 
4 
 
of confidence (Nicolson 1952, p. 399).  In 1993, Downing Street contacted Buckingham Palace to 
make sure that dissolution would be granted if the Government were defeated on a vote expressing 
confidence in the Government’s policy on adoption of the social chapter of the Maastricht treaty 
(Norton 1998, p. 85).  In the former case, after the leaders indicated no willingness to form a 
Government, MacDonald’s request for dissolution was granted when the Government was defeated in 
the House.  In the latter case, confirmation was given.  Although there were occasions when some 
authorities contended that it would be in order for a request to be denied (Norton 2014, p. 3) in 
practice no sovereign in the era of modern British politics denied a request for dissolution. 
 
The key point for our purpose is that it was a convention that if the Government lost the confidence of 
the House of Commons, it either resigned or requested the dissolution of Parliament.  Though there 
were some occasions of resignation, the more recent practice was to request dissolution and there was 
no occasion when that request was denied by the monarch.   
 
The House of Commons was taken as having confidence in the Government by virtue of agreeing its 
programme and enacting the measures placed before it.  There was no requirement for a vote of 
confirmation upon taking office, though agreeing the Queen’s Speech was generally taken as fulfilling 
that purpose.  Confidence was taken as continuing unless and until a motion expressing no confidence 
was passed.  The ways in which the House could express its lack of confidence in Her Majesty’s 
Government varied.  There were three distinct categories (Norton 1978a, pp. 363-5).    
 
a. Explicitly-worded motions 
 
This category comprises situations where the House either passed a motion declaring its lack of 
confidence in the Government or defeated one stating that the House had confidence in the 
Government.  The first of these could be a straightforward motion, ‘That this House has no 
confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’, as moved for example by Labour leader Neil Kinnock, on 
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2 November 1990 (HC Deb. 22 Nov. 1990, cols. 439-519).  It could also incorporate a reason for the 
lack of confidence.  Thus, for example, Kinnock on 27 March 1991 moved the motion, ‘That this 
House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government in the light of its inability to rectify the 
damage done to the British people by the poll tax’ (HC Deb. 27 March 1991, cols. 964-1053).  Most 
motions of no confidence moved by the Leader of the Opposition fell in this second category.  The 
salient point is that there was explicit reference to a lack of confidence.  In the 1950s and 1960s, it 
was not unusual to have motions, ‘That this House deplores…’ and in 1985 Neil Kinnock moved a 
motion ‘That this House censures Her Majesty’s Government for its gross mismanagement of the 
British economy…’, but subsequent motions referred explicitly to confidence.   As the House of 
Commons Library note on Confidence Motions observed, a ‘censure’ motion ‘can also apply to a 
broader category of motion which may have some of the characteristics of a confidence motion... but 
which does not appear from all the circumstances to have the intention of bringing about directly, by 
its passing, the removal of the Government’ (House of Commons Library 2013, p. 5).  Expressing 
explicitly no confidence in the Government removed ambiguity as to the purpose of the motion. 
 
A motion of no confidence would usually be tabled and moved by the Leader of the Opposition, 
though it was open to any Member to table such a motion.  It was, as Erskine May expressed it, 
established convention that the Government always acceded to the demand of the Leader of the 
Opposition to allot a day for discussion of the motion, with a reasonably early day invariably being 
found.  ‘This convention is founded on the recognized position of the Opposition as the potential 
Government, which guarantees the legitimacy of such an interruption of the normal course of 
business.  For its part, the Government has everything to gain by meeting such a direct challenge to its 
authority at the earliest possible moment’ (Jack 2011, p. 344).  
 
In the 20th Century, there were two occasions when a motion of no confidence was carried.  After the 
Baldwin Government lost the December 1923 general election, it maintained the old practice of facing 
the new House of Commons: it was defeated on 21 January 1924 on an amendment to the loyal 
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address expressing no confidence in the Government.  On 28 March 1979, Conservative leader 
Margaret Thatcher moved the motion ‘That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s 
Government’. The motion was carried by 311 votes to 310 (HC Deb. 28 March 1979, cols. 461-590).  
This was the only occasion when a vote of no confidence was carried where the outcome was unclear 
until the result was announced.   
 
The second type under this heading was where the Government invited the House to pass a motion 
declaring that it had confidence in Her Majesty’s Government and the motion was defeated.  On 
occasion, a Government may lose an important vote and the defeat give rise to doubts as to whether 
the Government retained the confidence of the House.  In such circumstances, the Prime Minister 
could ask the House to pass a motion expressing its confidence in the Government.  Prime Minister 
James Callaghan moved a motion on 14 December 1978 expressing confidence in the Government in 
its determination to strengthen the economy, control inflation, reduce unemployment, and secure 
social justice (HC Deb. 14 Dec. 1978, cols. 920-1049).  This followed defeat in two votes on the 
Government’s counter-inflation policy the previous day.  On 23 July 1993, Prime Minister John 
Major moved ‘That this House has confidence in Her Majesty’s Government on the adoption of the 
Protocol on Social Policy’ (HC Deb. 23 July 1992, cols. 627-725), following the Government’s defeat 
the previous day on the social chapter.  On both occasions, the Government secured a majority.  There 
have been no occasions over the past century when a Government has moved a motion of confidence 
and lost. 
 
b. Confidence attaching to votes on substantive issues 
 
A Government may decide that a measure was so central to its programme that there would be little 
point in continuing in office if defeated on it.  The Prime Minister would therefore make clear that, if 
defeated, this would trigger resignation or a general election.  Attaching confidence to a vote was a 
means of maximising the Government’s voting strength, its supporters not wishing to cause the 
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Government’s resignation or, more especially, an election that could result in its opponent party being 
elected to office. 
 
In 1944, the Government was defeated on an amendment to the Education Bill, something that 
apparently annoyed Prime Minister Winston Churchill: it was reversed in a vote made one of 
confidence (HC Deb. 30 March 1944, cols. 1605-54; see Cazalet-Keir 1967, pp. 143-5).  On Second 
Reading of the European Communities Bill in 1972, giving effect to the UK’s membership of the 
European Communities, Prime Minister Edward Heath told the House that ‘if this House will not 
agree to the Second Reading of the Bill…. my colleagues and I are unanimous that in these 
circumstances this Parliament cannot sensibly continue’ (HC Deb. 17 Feb. 1972, col. 752).  In 1993, 
John Major made passage of the European Communities (Finance) Bill ‘in all its essentials’ as an 
issue of confidence.  In March 1976, an adjournment motion was treated as a confidence vote, 
primarily because there was not time to table a substantive motion of no confidence in time for the 
debate following a Government defeat the previous day.  
 
The Government on these occasions secured a majority.  However, the first Labour Government was 
not so fortunate.  In October 1924, the Cabinet decided to treat a Conservative motion of censure on 
the Campbell case, and a Liberal amendment calling for the appointment of a select committee, as 
issues of confidence (Cook 1975, p. 276).  The Liberal amendment was carried by 364 votes to 199 
and Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald was granted dissolution (Nicolson 1952, pp. 399-400, Cook 
1975, pp. 276-7).   
 
c. Implicit votes of confidence 
 
The third category comprised what were considered to be implicit votes of confidence, notably votes 
on the Queen’s Speech and the Budget.  The measures falling in this category were small in number 
and, indeed, as the House of Commons Library Note put it, ‘speculative’ (House of Commons Library 
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2013, p 8, see also Norton 1978a, pp. 364-5).  There was no certainty that the Government would 
regard defeat as demonstrating that it had lost the confidence of the House.   The Times in 1977 
opined that ‘there is no constitutional principle that requires a Government to regard any specific 
policy defeat as evidence that it no longer possesses the necessary confidence of the House of 
Commons’ (cited in Marshall 1985, p. 56).  In 1905, Prime Minister Arthur Balfour refused to treat a 
defeat on a specific estimate as a vote of censure.  Lord Rosebery’s Government was defeated on an 
amendment to the Address in 1894 and did not treat it as a censure vote (Norton 1978a, p. 366).   
 
These instances exemplify the extent to which determination of what constituted a vote of confidence 
was not watertight.  A Government defeat in the division lobbies did not by itself constitute a vote of 
no confidence.  The Government could suffer defeats on motions that raised no issue of confidence 
and these did not engage the convention (Norton 1978a, pp. 360-78).  Between 1972 and 1979, the 
Government suffered no fewer than 65 defeats in the division lobbies of the House of Commons.1  
Only the last of these – the defeat on an explicit vote of no confidence on 28 March 1979 – triggered a 
general election. 
 
The Government may decide, or decline, to treat a particular vote (other than one on an explicitly 
worded motion of confidence or no confidence) as one of confidence.  If it decided that confidence 
attached, or if a motion was explicitly worded, then defeat led to resignation or dissolution.  However, 
beyond that, there was some element of ambiguity.  Government and Opposition may disagree as to 
the status of a vote.  In such cases, it was always open to the Opposition to move a motion of no 
confidence if it believed that it raised an issue of confidence.  It was thus possible for both 
Government and Opposition to test whether the Government retained the confidence of the House.  
Although votes of confidence, whether explicit or designated as confidence votes, were rare, there 
                                                          
1 There were six in the 1970-74 Parliament, 17 in the Parliament of Feb.-Oct. 1974, and 42 in the Parliament of 
1974-79. On those in the 1974 and 1974-79 Parliaments, see Norton 1980, pp. 491-3.   
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was an element of ambiguity as to the contours of such votes.  The convention, though, was clear: a 
Government defeated in a vote of confidence either resigned or requested dissolution.   
 
3. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 
 
The coalition agreement negotiated by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in May 2010 
committed the Government to introducing a Fixed-term Parliaments Bill  (HM Government 2010, p. 
26).  During the negotiations leading to the agreement, there was a thirty-minute debate on the 
procedures for an early dissolution.  As one of the Liberal Democrat negotiators, David Laws, 
recorded, ‘William Hague soon realised that the main risk lay with the Conservatives. Without a 
super-majority for dissolution being required, the smaller party could leave the coalition and dissolve 
parliament almost at will’ (Laws 2010, p. 183).  In order words, the junior partner to a coalition could 
walk away, leaving the Government vulnerable to defeat by a combination of opposition parties.  The 
implication was that this would be through a vote of no confidence.  To protect the position of the 
Conservatives, it was agreed that there should be a super-majority for dissolution.  Agreement was 
reached on 55 per cent of MPs having to vote for an early election.  This figure was reached on the 
basis that this would be a sufficiently high bar to prevent the Labour and other opposition parties 
combining to trigger an early election against the wishes of the Conservatives (Laws 2010, p. 184).   
 
Had the Government legislated on the basis of the agreement as worded, it would have made it 
unusual for having no provision for an early election to be triggered by the House expressing a lack of 
confidence in the Government.  It would also have rendered the UK unusual in having a threshold (55 
per cent) for triggering an early election that was similar to provisions employed in Lithuania, 
Mongolia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (see HL Deb. 21 March 2011, col. 573).  It is more common 
to have a threshold of two-thirds of members, as indeed is the case in the devolved legislatures of the 
UK.   
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Between publication of the agreement and introduction of the legislation, the Government changesd 
its mind over the provision for a super-majority, changing the threshhold from 55 per cent to two-
thirds of all MPs.  There was also pressure to maintain provision for an early election in the event of 
the Government losing a vote of confidence.  The reason for its exclusion was logical in terms of 
wanting dissolution to be possible only in the event of a super-majority, but the reasoning behind the 
exclusive provision in the agreement was flawed in that, if the junior partner to a coalition left the 
Government and joined with opposition parties, the combined forces could defeat government on a 
range of key votes, making it effectively impossible for the Government to govern.  The use of a no 
confidence vote was the cleanest, rather than the only, way of demonstrating that the Government 
lacked the confidence of the House. 
 
Pressure to include provisions for an early election in the event of the loss of a vote of confidence 
resulted in a Bill notably different to that envisaged in the coalition agreement.  As the Advocate 
General for Scotland, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, conceded during debates on the Bill in the Lords, 
‘it will be obvious that the proposals in the Bill are not the ones described in the [Laws] book’ (HL 
Deb. 21 March 2011, col. 568).  The Bill was designed to maintain the existing convention that the 
Government rested on the confidence of the House for its continuation in office and that the House 
could withdraw that confidence (Constitution Committee 2010a, p. 27), a point reiterated by Nick 
Clegg in the Second Reading debate on the Bill (HC Deb. 13 Sept. 2010, col. 630).  A simple majority 
would be sufficient to carry a motion of no confidence.   
 
There was a variation from existing practice in that, following the loss of a confidence vote, the 
Government no longer had an option of requesting dissolution.  Under the Bill, a general election did 
not necessarily follow if a new (or reconstituted) Government was formed within fourteen days and 
achieved a vote of confidence from the House.  That was not that dissimilar from the previous 
situation if a Government defeated on a vote of confidence opted to resign.  The sovereign would 
invite the Leader of the Opposition or whoever was felt capable of commanding a majority in the 
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House of Commons to form a Government.  The new Prime Minister may request dissolution.  Under 
the provisions of the Bill, this process was heavily compressed into the period of fourteen days, with 
dissolution being automatic if a vote of confidence in a new Government was not secured within that 
period.  This two-step procedure is also exceptional, though not unique, in international comparison.  
A similar procedure is adopted in Albania, Armenia and Serbia. 
  
The Bill did not define what constituted a vote of no confidence.  Rather it adopted the approach taken 
under the convention that, as Ruth Fox told the House of Lords Constitution Committee, it ‘is one of 
those things where you know it when you see it’ (Constitution Committee 2010a, pp. 28-9).  The 
Government wished to retain the flexibility of the previous system.  ‘In practice’, declared the Deputy 
Prime Minister, ‘there is little doubt about what constitutes a motion of no confidence in a 
Government, and there is no need to limit the flexibility of Parliament unnecessarily’ (Memorandum 
from the Deputy Prime Minister to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, July 2010).  Though 
there may have been little doubt, there was nonetheless the potential for some doubt.  It was necessary 
for someone to determine what constituted ‘a motion of no confidence’.  The Government felt that 
this task was most appropriately vested in the Speaker of the House of Commons. 
 
Under the Bill as introduced, the determination that a vote of no confidence had been passed was by 
way of a Speaker’s certificate.  Under clause 2 of the Bill, it was for the Speaker to certify that ‘the 
House had passed a motion that there should be an early parliamentary general election’ or if ‘on a 
specified day the House passed a motion of no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government (as then 
constituted)’.  In the case of no confidence votes, the Speaker had to certify that the period of fourteen 
days after the specified day has ended without the House passing ‘any motion expressing confidence 
in any Government of Her Majesty’. 
 
There was a precedent for the Speaker to issue a certificate.  Under the Parliament Act 1911 (section 1 
(2)) the Speaker is required to certify Money Bills (see Jennings 1957, pp. 415-22).  However, there is 
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a statutory definition of a Money Bill.  Furthermore, certification only takes place when the Bill has 
completed its passage through the Commons.  With confidence votes under the Fixed-term 
Parliaments Bill, the Speaker would be in a position of having to certify in advance whether or not a 
motion was a vote of confidence and to do so without any statutory stipulation or guidance.  The 
Government's response to the Constitution Committee report states: ‘Where there is doubt about 
whether a motion is a no-confidence motion, we would expect the Speaker to inform Members before 
they vote on it whether, if it were it to be passed, he would certify it as a no-confidence motion’ (HM 
Government 2011, para. 33). 
 
The Speaker was thus seen as the person to apply the previous understanding of what constituted a 
confidence vote.  However, this approach gave rise to two problems.  The first was that it could bring 
the Speaker into the realms of political controversy.  The Government may decide that a vote on 
Second Reading of a Government Bill was one of confidence.  The Speaker potentially could take a 
different view and refuse to certify it.  The vote on a Second Reading of major Government Bill may 
be considered by the Opposition to be one of confidence, but not be treated as such by the Speaker.  
Though it would be open to the Opposition subsequently to table an explicitly worded motion of no 
confidence, doing so would be tantamount to criticising the decision of the Speaker.  Would defeat on 
the Queen’s Speech, or a central provision of the Budget, constitute the House expressing its lack of 
confidence in the Government?  Some authorities had previously adopted a fairly expansive definition 
of a confidence vote, viewing any defeat as an issue of confidence (Radice 1977, p. 4), or one on a 
three-line whip (de Zulueta 1971).  Although these views found no basis in practice (Norton 1978a, 
pp. 360-1), there was nothing to prevent a Speaker adopting a definition that went beyond what was 
seen previously as the boundary between confidence votes and those not entailing issues of 
confidence. 
 
This leads to the second problem, one that was raised by the Clerk of the House of Commons 
following introduction of the Bill.  He submitted a memorandum to the Political and Constitutional 
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Reform Committee of the House of Commons contending that the provisions for the Speaker to 
certify that either condition for an early election had been met meant that the Speaker’s consideration 
of confidence motions and the House’s practices became justiciable questions for determination by 
the ordinary courts.  ‘Not only might the Speaker’s decisions involve difficult judgements – for 
example about what constitutes a confidence motion, the selection of amendments to such Motions 
and the consequences of their being carried ‘, he wrote, ’but they would be made in a potentially 
highly charged political situation which could also lead to challenge in the House.  As these would 
become justiciable questions, the courts could be drawn into matters of acute political controversy’ 
(Political and Constitutional Reform Committee 2010, Ev. 20).  
 
Grounds for challenge could be found in the clause as worded.  Clause 2 (2)(a) stipulated that a 
motion of no confidence had to be passed.  As the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of 
the House of Commons (2010, p. 14) recorded: 
 
It is hard to see… how a Speaker could certify that the House had ‘passed a motion of no 
confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’, as the Bill requires, if it had voted down a motion 
designated as a matter of confidence by the Government, even a motion ‘That this House has 
confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’, but not in fact ‘passed’ a motion at all.  
 
The flexibility that was possible under a convention clashed with the need for certainty in legislative 
drafting.  The Deputy Prime Minister made clear that he was ‘absolutely confident’ that the Bill as 
drafted was not amenable to judicial review (HC Deb. 13 Sept. 2010, col. 629), a view supported by 
other authorities (Hazell 2010, p. 38, though see also Youngs and Thomas-Symonds 1013, pp. 540-
56), but nonetheless acknowledged that it may be necessary to strengthen or clarify the position 
(Constitution Committee 2010b, Q67).   
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Despite this acknowledgement, ministers initially responded to the concerns raised, not least by the 
Constitution Committee in the House of Lords (Constitution Committee 2010a, pp. 29-30), by 
declaring that they were not persuaded of the case to specify in the Bill the wording of motions of no 
confidence.  Doing so, it said, would ‘have needlessly interfered in the House of Common’s [sic] 
internal arrangements’ (HM Government 2011, para. 36).  The Government did not see a problem in 
respect of the Speaker’s certificate.  ‘We do not believe that this will in any way risk bringing the 
Speaker into political controversy’ (HM Government 2011, para. 34).   
 
However, during the Bill’s passage in the House of Lords, the Government faced considerable 
pressure to amend the provisions for forcing an early election and there was the prospect of 
amendments being carried against the Government’s wishes.  Although the Government moved no 
amendments of its own to remove provision for certification by the Speaker, it decided to accept at 
Report stage – in other words, at a late stage in the Bill’s passage – a backbench amendment to 
replace clause 2.  As Lord Wallace of Tankerness put it, ‘We certainly have no desire to draw the 
Speaker of the House of Commons into political controversy, and therefore, given that the 
architecture for an early election is drawn up with a degree of certainty with no need of a Speaker's 
certificate, the Government are willing to support the amendment’ (HL Deb. 16 May 2011, col. 1170).    
Under the new clause, there was no requirement for a Speaker’s certificate.  Instead, it provided that 
the two circumstances under which a general election was triggered were by specified motions.  One 
was ‘That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’ and, if within fourteen days, a 
new Government has not achieved passage of the motion ‘That this House has confidence in Her 
Majesty’s Government’ an election was to take place.  The other was ‘That there shall be an early 
general election’ and was to be carried if the motion was agreed without a division or, if in a division, 
two-thirds or more of all MPs voted for it.  The new clause was agreed and forms section 2 of the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011.   
 
4. Consequences 
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The provisions for triggering a general election through the House of Commons expressing its lack of 
confidence in the Government thus changed at different stages.  It did so essentially as a result of 
those responsible for the coalition Government not appreciating the nature and significance of the 
convention governing confidence votes and having to adapt the Government’s proposals in the light 
of pressure, not least from members of the House of Lords.    
 
The effect of amending the provisions for calling an early general election was significant.  It was not 
simply a matter of a drafting change that clarified what was intended.   The changes altered 
fundamentally the relationship between the convention that previously existed and what was now 
provided by statute.  The measure no longer embodied what was previously covered by the 
convention.  Section 2 of the Act in effect sweeps away the possibility for Government to call an early 
election as a consequence of a defeat on a vote which it has declared to be a matter of confidence.  
The Act also means that defeat on what were deemed implicit votes of confidence would not trigger 
an election.  If the House votes down the Budget or rejects the Government’s programme as embodied 
in the Queen’s Speech, the provisions of the Act are not engaged.  They only apply if, in consequence 
of such a defeat, a motion ‘That this House has no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’ is 
moved and carried.  In short, the three types of confidence votes that could result in an early election  
under the convention are now confined to the first – an explicitly worded motion.  The wording has to 
be precise.  A motion deploring or censuring the Government would not qualify.  Thus, it is not just a 
case of the first category alone, but a very clearly defined part of that category.   
 
The change between the Bill as introduced and the Bill as enacted has notable implications for 
Government.  The primary purpose of the Bill was to remove the Prime Minister’s capacity to employ 
the prerogative to call a general election at a time of his or her choosing (an opportunistic election).  
However, the effects of the amendments to the Bill in regards to votes of confidence rob of him also 
of another power.  The Prime Minister can no longer designate a vote as a confidence vote and say to 
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Government MPs that, if the vote goes against the Government, there will be a general election.  
There is thus no longer any capacity to repeat the words of Edward Heath on Second Reading of the 
European Communities Bill in 1972.   
 
Nor is there the capacity for the Prime Minister to move a motion of confidence following a defeat on 
a major issue of policy with the result that, if the motion is lost, an election is triggered.  During 
debate on the Bill at Report stage in the Lords, some amendments were moved to provide for the 
Prime Minister to retain such a capacity (HL Deb. 16 May 2011, cols. 1146-76),2  but the Government 
resisted them.  The justification for opposing them was that, as Lord Wallace of Tankerness 
explained, ‘a Motion of confidence would be easier for the Government of the day to table and then 
have voted down than for the Government to lose a Motion of no confidence’ (HL Deb. 16 May 2011, 
col. 1170).  To avoid manipulation of this sort, the Government arranging a defeat on a vote of 
confidence in order to engineer an election at a time of its choosing, the Act thus deprives the Prime 
Minister of an important political tool.   
 
The Prime Minister, in short, has lost the capacity to trigger a general election through attaching 
confidence to a particular vote.  The capacity to resign remains.  The Prime Minister could still say 
that confidence attaches to an important vote and, that if defeated, the Government will resign.  If the 
Government did tender its resignation, the provisions of the Act would not be triggered.  We would 
thus be in novel, but not unprecedented, constitutional territory.  There is a 20th Century precedent for 
a Government resigning without seeking dissolution.  The Conservative Government of Arthur 
Balfour was falling apart in 1905 and Balfour tendered the Government’s resignation.  The Liberal 
leader, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, formed a Government and then sought dissolution (Adams 
2007, p. 227, Russell 1973, pp. 34-5).  Under the 2011 Act, seeking dissolution would no longer be 
possible.   
 
                                                          
2 The author declares an interest as one of those moving one of the amendments. 
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The likelihood of a Government opting to resign in conditions where it has been defeated on a major 
issue may be small, though it remains an option.3  The essential point is that the option of resigning or 
seeking dissolution is no longer available to a Prime Minister in order to facilitate passage of a 
contested provision.  Dissolution is no longer within the premier’s gift. 
 
When it did exist, it was not a power that was frequently used.  As we have seen, it was rare for 
Governments to test the confidence of the House, as opposed to the Opposition pressing motions of no 
confidence, but the ability to declare that a vote was one of confidence enabled a Prime Minister to 
maximise the Government’s voting strength and see a measure through that otherwise might not be 
passed.  In 1972, Heath secured the Second Reading of the European Communities Bill by a majority 
of eight votes.  Even with making it a vote of confidence, fifteen Conservative MPs voted against the 
Bill and a further five abstained from voting (Norton 1975, p. 406; see also Kitzinger 1973, Ch. 13 
and appendix 1).  Nonetheless, there is evidence that making it a confidence vote served to deflate the 
scale of cross-voting by Conservative MPs (Norton 1978b, pp. 73-4); they were not prepared to bring 
the Government down (Norton 1978b, p. 198). 
 
In 1993, as we have seen, John Major employed a confidence motion to achieve adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty social chapter, having previously been defeated on it the previous day.  In the vote 
the previous day, 26 Conservatives had voted with the Opposition, the Government losing by 324 
votes to 316 (HC Deb. 22 July 1992, cols. 606-10; see Seldon 1997, p. 388).  As Major recalled, ‘The 
Cabinet was aware that a Confidence Motion, if lost, could be a death warrant, but saw it as preferable 
to the European battle continuing unresolved over the summer’ (Major 1999, p. 382).  It had the 
desired effect.  When it was made an issue of confidence, no Conservative voted against the 
Government.  One abstained from voting.  The motion was carried by 339 votes to 299.  ‘The 
Eurosceptics had made their point.  They had blocked and humiliated the government, but they were 
                                                          
3 It also remains an option, as in the instance of the resignation of Balfour’s Government, for the Government to 
resign without the action being triggered by the loss of a particular vote.   
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not ready, yet, to bring it down’ (Seldon 1997, p. 388).  Had Major not been able to make the vote one 
of confidence, and ensure that the social chapter was approved, it would not have been possible to 
bring into effect the provisions of the Act enabling the Maastricht treaty to be ratified. 
 
The rationale for the Fixed-term Parliament Bill, according to Nick Clegg, was to transfer power from 
the Prime Minister to the House of Commons.   
 
The Bill has a single, clear purpose: to introduce fixed-term Parliaments to the United 
Kingdom to remove the right of the Prime Minister to seek the Dissolution of Parliament for 
pure political gain....  Crucially, if, for some reason, there is a need for Parliament to dissolve 
early, that will be up to the House of Commons to decide. (HC Deb. 13 Sept.2013, col. 621).  
 
The provision for an early general election by a vote of two-thirds of all MPs could be seen as putting 
power in the hands of the principal parties in the House.  As Vernon Bogdanor observed, it would 
essentially be the party leaders getting together to agree that an election was justified.  ‘While the Act 
might conceivably alter the conditions under which political leaders can seek a dissolution, it is hardly 
likely to give more power to backbench MPs or to strengthen Parliament’ (Bogdanor 2011, p. 119).  
The provision for a motion of no confidence was somewhat different in that it essentially transferred 
power to the hands of recalcitrant backbenchers.  It did not transfer power to the House as a whole, as 
it already held the power to bring down a Government on a vote of confidence.  Rather, it 
strengthened the position of Government backbenchers in opposing substantive measures.  The Prime 
Minister could no longer make it a vote in which one had to choose between opposing the measure or 
avoiding a general election.  A Prime Minister could, as we have indicated, make it a choice between 
opposing the measure or avoiding the Government’s resignation, but the capacity to trigger an 
election is gone.  Threatening resignation is a powerful tool, but it is not equal to the threat of a 
general election.  With an election, backbenchers are vulnerable to losing their seats.  The resignation 
of the Government means  the Government is out, but backbenchers are not.  Dissident backbenchers 
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could be threatened with withdrawal of the party whip, but when the Major Government pursued that 
route it backfired – the whipless MPs used their status as a badge of honour, and the whip was soon 
restored (Norton 1998, pp. 86-9).  There is little to match the impact of threatening a general election.  
In an era when Government backbenchers are willing to vote against their own side more often than 
before (Norton 1975, 1978b, 1980, 1985, Cowley 2002, 2005, Cowley and Stuart 2014), the removal 
of an important power of the Prime Minister to maximise voting support could prove to be crucial in 
the event of a party split on a major issue.  
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